A Rejoinder: "Wild Dreams"
On 6 April 2025, the Press Information Bureau, the government’s nodal media agency, sent The Caravan a response on the April 2025 cover story “Wild Dreams: Modi’s cheetah project is falling apart.” The PIB has accused The Caravan of carrying the story with the “nefarious motive of tarnishing the image” of the Narendra Modi government. This accusation is not only baseless, it is an explicit attempt to undermine the legitimate questions raised in the report and to intimidate and undermine independent journalism.
The PIB’s response is riddled with misrepresentations, sweeping generalisations and a wilful refusal to engage with the substance of our reporting. It leans on rhetorical claims in place of evidence and ignores the extensive expert analysis, government documents and ground-level reporting that informs the piece.
Our story, the product of over seven months of reporting, is based on interviews with current and former government officials, conservation experts, members of affected communities and independent researchers in India and abroad. It draws on court records, government press releases, scientific literature and internal reports related to Project Cheetah. Every quote, claim and assertion in the story went through the rigour of our editorial process and was thoroughly fact checked. Our conclusions are drawn directly from the facts on record. And the facts point to a project in disarray—scientifically questionable in its planning, opaque in its execution and, as our reporting shows, politically manipulated to serve narratives unrelated to ecological conservation.
Prior to publication, The Caravan reached out to all key bodies involved with the project, including the steering committee, the National Tiger Conservation Authority, the environment ministry and state agencies in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. Not a single response was received, except for one limited reply from the chairperson of the steering committee, in December 2024. Our follow-up queries went unanswered. The PIB, which has no direct role in the project’s planning or execution, has instead issued a sweeping rejoinder accusing our reportage of being “a deliberate attempt to show the Government in poor light.”
We have reproduced their objections in full below, along with our responses.
This is in response to the article titled “Modi’s Cheetah project is falling apart” published in the caravanmagazine.in on April 1, 2025. The article has collated several baseless negative media coverage since the inception of Project Cheetah and tried to portray it as a failure. It is important to mention that most of the misrepresented facts have been addressed earlier on various platforms and the instant article is an attempt to rekindle the same with the nefarious motive of tarnishing the image of the Government. The project has faced persistent criticism, often rooted in ideological biases, non-contextual extrapolations, and sensationalized narratives. While constructive criticism has been welcomed by the Government to refine protocols and strategies in Project Cheetah, the selective use of information, literature, emphasis on negative outcomes, exploitation of public sympathy by propagating false information portrays that sensationalism and personal agendas over the science based genuine progress made under Project Cheetah is the basis of such narratives.
No attempt has been made to highlight the progress achieved under the said project which reinforces our belief that the article is a deliberate attempt to show the Government in poor light.
India's Project Cheetah, initiated in 2022, represents a holistic conservation translocation initiative aimed at restoring cheetah populations, reviving grassland ecosystems, and fostering socio-economic benefits in identified landscapes.
The article has largely portrayed the following issues incorrectly.
1. Lack of scientific basis: Critiques have relied on oversimplified comparison and selective use of available literature, often overlooking the adaptive management being undertaken and the cheetah’s behavioral flexibility. The limitations of applying ecological parameters from one region to another without considering local ecology have not been considered. The project is still in its infancy and drawing conclusions at this point of time is premature. In fact the cheetah action plan gives definitive parameters to assess success or failure which at this juncture, has been achieved by the project. The project is grounded in scientific principles and adheres strictly to IUCN-established protocols for species introductions and conservation translocations.
As we have noted in our story, scientific and institutional experts—including the Supreme Court-appointed Central Empowered Committee—warned that India lacks the habitat and prey density to sustain cheetahs. In 2018, the CEC advised against the introduction of African cheetahs, stating that bringing in cheetahs would “result in serious man-animal conflict with disastrous consequences.” It drew on studies, field data and expert consultations. The project was not included in India’s National Wildlife Action Plan (2017–31), indicating it was never a conservation priority grounded in national consensus or expert consultation.
The government’s invocation of “adaptive management” does not explain or justify the evident policy improvisations. Reporting on unfolding outcomes is not “premature”—it is essential public-interest journalism. Our report is based on rigorous fieldwork and expert testimony from India and Africa, all of which raise serious concerns about habitat readiness, prey availability, the security of communities living near the project sites and the long-term viability of such a project.
Recent media reports have also corroborated these issues, noting mass relocation of prey, leopard removals from Gandhisagar and aggressive habitat alteration. As the ecologist Bettina Wachter told The Caravan, there is no scientific reason to expect cheetahs in India to behave differently from those in Africa. The story speaks for itself. The project lacks a firm scientific foundation and remains out of step with established conservation norms.
2. Cheetahs in captivity: This has been one of the constant and deliberate tactic to discredit Project Cheetah in India. The World Association of Zoos and Aquariums defines captivity as the confinement of animals in man-made enclosures with reliance on human care. The cheetahs in Kuno are temporarily in fenced natural habitats within the larger Kuno landscape which allows the animals to exhibit their natural behaviour while adapting to the new environment. The practice of carnivore introduction using soft release sites has been documented to increase the chances of success by nearly 2.5 times.
In so far as the duration of cheetahs in these natural fenced areas is concerned, it is pertinent to mention that Project Cheetah uses an adaptive management strategy to maximise chances of the founder population establishing successfully. The project faced unforeseen challenges in the initial stages which prompted the field management to temporarily recapture these animals and bring them back to the fenced areas for close monitoring and medical interventions. Subsequent learnings ensured that the problem did not recur. As on date, there are 17 cheetahs in free ranging conditions in Kuno.
This is a belaboured attempt to sidestep the fact that African cheetahs in Kuno remain in captivity, by playing around with the definition. The fenced enclosures in Kuno qualify as zones of captivity according to the PIB’s own preferred definition: “the confinement of animals in man-made enclosures with reliance on human care.” These enclosures are stocked with prey, sometimes even meat, and maintained by human caretakers—which multiple wildlife experts and officials, quoted in the story, confirm is indistinguishable from captivity—and so cannot be thought to be “soft-release sites.”
As the story notes, “large carnivores captured from the wild should not be held captive for more than ninety days. If they are held captive for longer than that, the carnivore should either be euthanised or remain permanently captive. This is because, as Wachter explained, ‘the longer a wild born cheetah stays in captivity, the more difficult it gets to adapt again to the wild, to hunt successfully and to resume their communication system.’ Cheetahs in prolonged captivity may also gain weight and lose muscle, with the result that they end up physically unfit for release in the wild.” To survive in the wider Kuno landscape, the cheetahs also need to learn to manage threats from existing large predators, such as leopards, and this, too, cannot be taught in captivity.
The rejoinder again invokes “adaptive management” without providing any specifics of what this means other than the prolonged captivity of the African cheetahs since their arrival in India. At least one cheetah has reportedly not been released in the wild since its arrival from Namibia. What the “unforeseen challenges” are, and the reasons for repeated recaptures of released cheetahs and prolonged confinement—until as late as December 2024—have not been transparently disclosed. Our investigation, based on conversations with officials previously involved with Project Cheetah, also revealed that some recaptures were politically motivated. Cheetahs that moved towards Rajasthan were brought back, reportedly because the state was not ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party at the time. This changed after the BJP came to power, in late 2023. Subsequently, no cheetahs have been recaptured despite continuing to roam near human settlements.
The Caravan sought official responses to these developments from the environment ministry, Project Cheetah leadership, and relevant state and park authorities. No replies were received.
3. Cheetah mortalities/ deaths: Available literature clearly indicates that the animal survival rates of translocated cheetahs vary significantly from 0 to 85% depending on the geography, habitat conditions and management practices. It is important to recognize that a certain degree of mortality is inherent in translocation operations which should not be immediately viewed as a criteria for failure, which is documented by the IUCN. The cheetah mortality rate at Kuno is well below the anticipated threshold of 50%. Further, the overall cub survival rate stands at 67% which is significantly high for a species which is known to experience very high cub mortality.
While a degree of mortality is expected in any wildlife translocation efforts, the repeated lack of transparency and the preventable nature of several deaths raise serious questions about both management practices and accountability. The claim made by the PIB at the end of this notice that “there has been no cheetah mortality due to unnatural causes” is also false and has been contradicted by expert accounts and official records. At least three cheetahs have died of severe dermatitis caused by satellite collars, as confirmed by South African veterinarians involved with the project. Others have died due to infighting and injuries sustained during unsuccessful mating attempts. In total, at least eight of the 20 adult cheetahs brought from Namibia and South Africa have died.
Mortality among cubs has also raised serious concerns. Several cubs born at Kuno have died from starvation and dehydration. In a particularly disturbing incident in November 2024, two cubs were found dead and mutilated within a fenced enclosure. The activist Ajay Dubey, quoted in our report, pointed to inconsistent official statements and a lack of clarity, despite the presence of surveillance cameras. “When the cheetahs die, the management authorities reveal very few details and the post-mortem reports are delayed and seldom shared,” he noted. “This lack of transparency suggests that the authorities are under tremendous pressure and very scared.”
The government has not provided a credible explanation for this incident or others, and the PIB’s rejoinder omits mention of these unnatural deaths altogether.
4. Lack of transparency: The issue of transparency has been incorrectly highlighted in the said article as all available material of concern has been placed in public domain and also shared with source countries from time to time. There is ongoing communication with these nations which have solicited various information from time to time which has been provided. In addition, press releases/ media briefs have been issued in a timely manner both by the State Government of Madhya Pradesh and the Government of India whenever the situation warranted.
The claim that Project Cheetah has been transparent does not bear out, going by official actions, extensive documentation and our reporting on the ground. As confirmed by several experts we spoke to, including South African wildlife experts who were on the consulting panel of the steering committee formed by the Modi government, communication has been erratic, one-sided or non-existent.
As mentioned in our report, in July 2024, the Madhya Pradesh government denied an RTI request filed by Ajay Dubey seeking official correspondence on Project Cheetah. No explanation was provided as to how this information could threaten national security or foreign relations—grounds typically reserved for sensitive defence or diplomatic matters.
International experts who served on the steering committee also documented being denied access to critical information. In a letter to the Supreme Court dated 15 July 2023, the wildlife veterinarians Adrian Tordiffe and Mike Toft described being shut out of communication during key medical emergencies involving cheetahs at Kuno. They learned of two cheetah deaths through media reports rather than through official channels and only received relevant diagnostic material much later—after it was too late to intervene. The letter explicitly warned that had timely information been shared, the fatal collar-related injuries and associated dermatitis might have been identified earlier and treated. The experts emphasised that they had to “beg for information,” and urged the court to mandate “timeous sharing of information and opinions before information is shared with media.”
In his response to our detailed questionnaire, the spokesperson for the South African ministry of forestry, fisheries and environment—which has been overseeing the translocation of cheetahs from that country to India—told us that their government “is in receipt of the annual reports for the periods 2022/23 and 2023/24”—as opposed to the quarterly progress reports that India was required to submit in accordance with the terms of the MoU.
5. Conflict: The article is contradictory with respect to the movement ecology of cheetahs as it comments on “earmarking” an area for cheetahs and later elaborates on the varying home range sites of the species as well as observing that cheetah territories occupy large swathes of land. The exploratory phase of any species while adapting to a new environment is well known and similar is the case with the cheetah. In the process of this exploration species do move into human dominated landscapes for which there are protocols in place. It is pertinent to know that no cheetah injury or death has been attributed to a conflict situation. In fact, the Government of India is successfully addressing the issues of man animal conflict through various interventions with respect to other species too such as the elephant, tiger and leopard.
Exploratory behaviour in translocated species is certainly natural, but repeated protocol breaches, conflicting statements from officials and the lack of clarity around the health and movements of the cheetahs raise serious concerns about the management of Project Cheetah and the credibility of the government’s reassurances.
The PIB’s assertion that “there are protocols in place” to manage instances where cheetahs stray into human-inhabited areas is directly contradicted by recent events at Kuno National Park. On 24 March 2025, five cheetahs moved out of the park’s boundaries and reached nearby villages, triggering panic among local residents. Videos of the incident, widely circulated in the media, show villagers chasing the cheetahs with sticks and stones. A forest department monitoring team was present but reportedly failed to intervene effectively.
The health condition of the five animals was visibly deteriorated. Peter Caldwell, a South African wildlife veterinarian who reviewed footage from the incident, described the cheetahs as being in “a severely compromised body condition, consistent with marked undernourishment” showing “clear signs of physiological and behavioural stress.”
Another video that surfaced more recently shows the same five cheetahs drinking water poured from a container by a vehicle driver associated with the monitoring team. Initially, the park authorities refused to clarify the individual’s role, before confirming that he was dismissed for violating protocols. That such a basic breach could occur—captured on video and only belatedly acknowledged—speaks to the absence of consistent training and accountability.
Overall, the government has not been forthcoming with updates about the movement and health of the cheetahs, 17 of whom are now said to be ranging free in the Kuno landscape and beyond.
6. Site selection: The Kuno National Park and other sites such as the Gandhisagar Wildlife Sanctuary and Banni Grassland area have been selected based on data available on record and also the overarching objective of restoring open natural ecosystems under the aegis of Project Cheetah. It is obvious that investment shall have to be made for recovering these areas for which there is highest political will in the country which needs to be viewed positively rather than with a negative connotation of the project being “politicised”. Efforts for habitat restoration as well as prey augmentation are ongoing at the Kuno National Park as well as Gandhisagar Wildlife Sanctuary in Madhya Pradesh under the project which is part of the cheetah action plan. Project Cheetah along with other flagship projects of the Government, is also a priority and not at the expense of the others, which has been incorrectly reported in the article. The lessons learnt from Project Cheetah could provide valuable insights into the intricacies of ecosystem restoration, species reintroduction, and habitat management. These insights, in turn, could contribute to global rewilding initiatives, aiding in the revival of ecosystems grappling with loss.
As far as the issue of lions is concerned, the earlier rationale of the species being only at one site in Gir is no longer tenable as lions have now moved into the greater Saurashtra landscape and have established a second home at the Barda Wildlife Sanctuary through natural dispersal.
The PIB’s assertion that Kuno and other proposed sites were selected on scientific grounds and in pursuit of ecosystem restoration overlooks the central question at the heart of our reporting: whether these sites were ever ecologically appropriate or politically neutral choices for the introduction of African cheetahs in the first place. Kuno had been earmarked for the translocation of Asiatic lions for conservation purposes, in 1995. Over time, as the Gujarat government refused to send lions from the Gir National Park to Kuno, the modified habitat became overgrown by woodland species—unsuitable for cheetahs, which prefer grassland and scrub habitats. In 2013, the Supreme Court directed the government to proceed with the lion translocation within six months and called the plan to introduce cheetahs to Kuno “arbitrary” and “illegal.” More than a decade later, this order remains unfulfilled, and the cheetah introduction has proceeded instead, in direct defiance of both the court and scientific consensus.
The government’s claim that lions have established a “second home” at Barda is misleading. Barda is a little over a hundred kilometres from Gir and lies within the same ecological and political geography. It offers neither the geographical isolation necessary to mitigate risks from epidemics nor sufficient space to sustain a viable lion population. Its elevation as an alternative to Kuno appears designed more to retain full control over Gujarat’s lion population than to serve long-term conservation goals.
Faiyaz Khudsar, a senior biologist who has studied the region, told us that Kuno has become increasingly overgrown by woodland vegetation—a habitat mismatch for cheetahs, which thrive in open grassland and scrub. The Cheetah Action Plan itself acknowledges the presence of invasive plant species and the need for intensive and ongoing habitat management—a concession that undermines the PIB’s claim of ecological readiness. Our reporting also found that the greater Kuno–Gandhisagar landscape, which includes parts of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, might be insufficient for the cheetahs and even socioeconomically disruptive for local communities.
The Caravan found multiple examples of wildlife being translocated to artificially augment prey population in Kuno and Gandhisagar—including herbivores from other protected areas and, most concerningly, the translocation of leopards from Gandhisagar, at least three of whom have reportedly died. These actions raise urgent questions about the ecological disruptions caused by Project Cheetah and the opportunity costs being borne by other species and habitats in India.
The project appears to have been driven by political optics and executive will, with little room for dissent or independent review. One international expert formerly associated with Project Cheetah told us that the Indian authorities were making decisions “based on fear rather than on good science,” and that as a result, “we have learnt very little about how suitable Kuno is for cheetahs and what the primary threats are there.”
The PIB suggests that criticism of the project’s politicisation is unwarranted. We respectfully submit that the health of India’s biodiversity is best served not by cheerleading but by rigorous debate, data transparency and constitutional compliance.
7. Relocation: Relocation of inhabitants within protected areas of India is a voluntary process wherein prior informed consent of the people is taken and the process as outlined in Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 and the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 is followed in later and spirit. This approach offers communities improved opportunities for socio-economic integration, instead of the restricted and isolated lifestyles they often experience within protected areas, a fact that critics have conveniently overlooked. Sporadic grievances of a few individuals cannot form the basis of determining whether the initiative is a failure.
The PIB’s characterisation of the relocation process as having been entirely voluntary and economically beneficial does not withstand scrutiny—especially when seen against the lived experiences of the displaced. It is correct that the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 require that the relocation of forest-dwelling communities from protected areas be conducted only with their prior informed consent and that such relocation be accompanied by adequate rehabilitation measures. However, as documented extensively in the story and in earlier research, the relocation process from Kuno—originally initiated for the lion translocation project and now repeated for Project Cheetah—has been marred by procedural flaws and widespread socioeconomic distress.
Contrary to the PIB’s assertion that critics have “conveniently overlooked” improved opportunities, displaced residents told The Caravan that the benefits promised to them decades ago remain largely unfulfilled. Our reporting revealed that communities continue to struggle with unemployment, water scarcity and loss of access to forest produce, among other challenges. This hardship is not limited to “sporadic grievances of a few individuals” but is a widespread issue, echoed across displaced villages as our reporter was able to glean from residents and activists.
An academic study we cited found that the relocation caused “numerous avoidable hardships” for the displaced. These included delays in providing land titles, inadequately developed resettlement sites and failure to ensure that all displaced households received their full entitlements. Also, because of a flawed process of identification of beneficiaries, many families who qualified never received compensation. We sent specific questions on these issues to the tribal-welfare department of Madhya Pradesh and the DM of Sheopur district, but did not receive a response.
Further, many residents now live in the buffer zones around Kuno, where restrictions on forest use still apply and where forest dependency remains high. Far from improving their condition, the relocation has in many cases undermined people’s ability to sustain their livelihoods and cultural connections to the forest.
We directed questions to the forest and tribal-development departments, as well as the chief secretary, of the Gujarat government regarding the process of consultation and soliciting consent of the local Maldhari pastoralist community in the Banni grasslands. We also asked them to provide reasons for their non-compliance with the directions, issued by the union ministry of tribal affairs, to address the Maldharis’ rights recognition claims and provide them with titles in accordance with the forest rights act. We did not receive any response.
8. Funding for Project Cheetah: The article has again misrepresented facts with respect to funding for the project as the information has been provided to the Hon’ble Parliament of India which is available in public domain. The said project has been funded under the Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority, the Centrally Sponsored Scheme of Project Tiger, the National Tiger Conservation Authority Grants-in-Aid and Corporate Social Responsibility initiative of the Indian Oil Corporation Limited.
The PIB’s response sidesteps the core concern raised in our report: not the source of funding, which is publicly known, but the lack of transparency in expenditure. As noted in our article, the latest estimate of funds required for Project Cheetah over its first five years, Rs 91.65 crore, was placed before parliament in April 2023. This estimate predates the expansion of the project to new sites at Gandhisagar and Banni, and yet, nearly two years on, no updated financial projection or detailed expenditure report has been made public. The budget associated with Gandhisagar has not yet been made public. For a project of this scale and public interest, partial disclosures in parliamentary proceedings do not suffice when concrete implementation remains opaque and questions about the prioritisation of funds and conservation needs have not been satisfactorily answered.
9. Non engagement of foreign experts: The Government of India continues to engage with foreign experts from time to time when required with respect to sourcing, as well as addressing challenging management issues. While there was greater reliance in the early stages of the project, over a period of time, there have been considerable learnings which has reduced dependence as local expertise has gradually generated.
The Caravan raised a specific and timely concern: that several key international experts who were closely involved at the inception of the project are no longer part of its decision-making or operations.
They include Laurie Marker, who confirmed that she is no longer associated with the project; Adrian Tordiffe, who has since joined Vantara, Reliance’s private wildlife facility; and Vincent van der Merwe, who confirmed, before his death in March, that he had not been to recent meetings.
This disengagement is not a benign “reduction of dependence”—it points to a worrying isolation of the project from globally applicable standards of conservation, at a time when scrutiny and course correction are most needed. The PIB or the government has not named any currently active foreign experts or provided evidence of ongoing international engagement, especially in light of the numerous setbacks the project has faced, from unexplained mortalities to opaque relocation processes.
10. Involvement of private agencies in managing the project: There is no ongoing engagement with private agencies in Project Cheetah and neither is the Government of India in receipt of any proposal to involve private agencies.
This claim is contradicted by both official statements from international authorities, other media reports and what The Caravan has found in the course of its reporting. The South African ministry of forestry, fisheries and environment stated that the 12 cheetahs brought to India from South Africa in 2023 were not sourced from state-owned parks but from private reserves affiliated with the Metapopulation Initiative, a privately run conservation effort. The ministry further stated that negotiations around payments for these animals were to be conducted directly between the private cheetah owners and the Indian government—indicating active governmental involvement with private entities abroad.
During the course of our investigation, two individuals formerly associated with Project Cheetah independently told us that talks are underway to hand over management responsibilities at the Banni grasslands site to Vantara, a private wildlife facility established by Reliance Industries. Such talks—whether formalised or not—necessarily constitute early-stage engagement with a private player in a government-funded wildlife project. In May 2023, a four-member delegation from Vantara’s veterinary facility reportedly visited Kuno National Park following the death of three cheetahs. This visit is not mentioned in any official documents, including the project’s annual report or the monitoring committee’s minutes. Questions were sent to the chairperson of the Project Cheetah Steering Committee, the union environment ministry, Vantara and the NTCA, but none of them responded.
In the face of such developments, the PIB’s dismissal of our findings is not just inaccurate but an attempt to obscure serious transparency deficits in a high-stakes public conservation project. As our reporting has consistently highlighted, Project Cheetah is not just ecologically sensitive but socially and politically consequential. It draws from the public exchequer and demands relocations and disruptions in the lives of vulnerable communities. The public has the right to full, unambiguous information on how such a project is being run, and by whom.
11. Parameters of success: The IUCN Guidelines and Cheetah action plan outline the following parameters to determine the short term success of the project:
a. 50% survival of the introduced cheetah for the first year : Achieved
b. Cheetah establish home ranges in Kuno National Park : Ongoing
c. Cheetah successfully reproduce in the wild : Ongoing
d. Some wild born cheetah cubs survive to 1 year : Achieved
e. F1 generation breeds successfully : Not achieved
f. Cheetah based revenues contribute to community livelihoods : Initiated
The indicators listed here largely remain ongoing or inconclusive and cannot be presented as evidence of short-term success. For instance, the PIB claims that cheetah reproduction in the wild is ongoing and that cheetah-based revenues are contributing to local livelihoods. However, there is no public evidence to support either claim.
All reported cheetah births since the start of the project have occurred in captivity at Kuno National Park. There is no government data or independent confirmation that any cheetah has conceived or given birth after release into the wild.
As for economic impact, the Cheetah Action Plan outlined tourism-based revenue as a key benefit for local communities. But our ground reporting in Kuno found no such outcomes—cheetahs remained in captivity as recently as December 2024, limiting public sightings and tourism activity. The government has shared no data on revenue generated or how it is being distributed among affected communities.
Current Status of Project Cheetah in India
Within a span of 2.5 years, the project has witnessed the birth of 21 cubs of which 11 are in free ranging conditions. The cubs along with the adults are adapting well and hunting successfully. There has been no Cheetah mortality due to unnatural causes besides no death has occurred due to the potential causes identified in the Disease Risk Analysis, which is reflective of the high level of preparedness by Indian authorities. Significant veterinary expertise has been gained in the process and not a single cheetah death has occurred during immobilising operations. Timely interventions have been carried out on several occasions which has strengthened the founder population.
Eco tourism activities are gaining momentum with visitors having sightings of the cheetah in the wild. Revenues generated through ecotourism shall boost the local economy and the region should develop over time. An inclusive community agenda with nearly 400 Cheetah Mitras is being involved, with advice for expanding it to the adjoining territorial forest divisions is being implemented.
Preparations at the Gandhisagar Wildlife Sanctuary are complete with necessary infrastructure in place. Disease risk assessment is ongoing and the site is now in readiness to receive cheetahs.
Conversations are underway with the Government of Kenya which has consented to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with India. Engagement with the earlier source countries of Namibia and South Africa continues.
Keeping in view the fact presented above, it is evident that the article is biased and completely skewed towards presenting a negative narrative of Project Cheetah to its readers. Long term initiatives such as these demand diligent planning and implementation which during their course will inevitably face unforeseen challenges. Cheetah introduction efforts take time to yield results, the significant progress made in just two and a half years highlights its promising trajectory. As the nodal agency, the National Tiger Conservation Authority remains firmly committed to this visionary initiative, ensuring that the species reclaims its historical distribution.
The Caravan’s reportage neither denies the ambition of Project Cheetah nor dismisses the scale of the undertaking. What it questions is the opaque functioning, selective public communication and failure to meet key ecological and procedural benchmarks of the project, despite the significant public resources and social costs involved.
The government claims that 21 cubs have been born in India since the cheetahs were imported, with 11 now in free-ranging conditions. However, the government has yet to publicly release any independent, verifiable data on the survival, movement or mortality rates of these cubs in the wild. In the absence of such transparency, it is impossible for independent observers, let alone affected communities, to meaningfully assess the health or viability of this project and how it affects them.
Contrary to the PIB’s assertion, The Caravan’s report notes that eight of the adult cheetahs translocated to India have died since the project began, including multiple avoidable deaths. Most of these fatalities took place inside enclosures—conditions over which Indian authorities exercised complete control. It is worth recalling that the African cheetahs being introduced into India belong to a different sub-species than the locally extinct population, thus it is incorrect to describe the project as a reintroduction initiative.
The PIB’s claims of ecotourism “gaining momentum” and contributing to the local economy also merit closer scrutiny. Our reporting in Sheopur and surrounding areas of Kuno revealed little benefit to local communities, particularly those from forest-dwelling communities. Relocated villages continue to face acute gaps in basic services, while promises of economic upliftment remain largely unfulfilled. Meanwhile, the expansion of ecotourism without adequate environmental or social safeguards risks repeating earlier patterns of exclusion and displacement under the guise of conservation and development.
The PIB also claims that infrastructure at Gandhisagar is ready and that Kenya has agreed in principle to sign a memorandum of understanding. As recently as March this year, experts told us that while both Banni and Gandhisagar could be suitable habitat for cheetahs, they lacked prey and would require substantial investment for ecological restoration. We reiterate that neither has there been a transparent analysis of the ongoing, intensive modification of the habitat at Gandhisagar, nor is there any public record of the financial investments made towards the site. These developments do not in themselves resolve the serious ecological and ethical questions raised by international conservationists, such as the sidelining of foreign experts, the scale of ecological intervention the project requires or the reported involvement of private entities such as Vantara, which continues to evade public disclosure.
Finally, the PIB’s claim that The Caravan has shown a “negative bias” betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of journalism’s role in a democracy. Independent reporting is not propaganda; it holds power to account. Project Cheetah, by the government’s own admission, is a long-term initiative with high stakes—ecological, financial and social. For such an initiative, transparency and public accountability are not optional. They are essential.